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According to news accounts, on
March 3 of this year, 18 central banks
spent approximately $500 million to
support the international value of the
U.S. dollar. The Federal Reserve System
was reported to have spent $250 million
the previous day. While these interven-
tions may have slowed the decline of the
dollar, its future course would depend on
subsequent policies undertaken by either
the U.S. government or other nations.
In general, it is unclear why intervention
would have other than a temporary
impact on exchange rates, unless, as
most researchers have concluded, it sig-
nals changes in future monetary policy.
Numerous studies have analyzed the
impact of such operations on the level
and volatility of the dollar's exchange
rate with the German mark and the
Japanese yen. Their overall conclusion is
that while intervention often affects
either the level or the volatility of the
exchange rate, the direction of the effect
varies from study to study and from time
to time.
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Disparities about the efficacy of inter-
vention in large part reflect disagreement
over the mechanism through which
intervention influences exchange rates.
Many economists and market analysts
view intervention as signaling changes
in future monetary policy. In the exam-
ple above, the signal may have been that
U.S. interest rates would surpass market
expectations.
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In this Economic Commentary, I discuss
some doubts about the ability of inter-
vention to signal upcoming monetary
policy changes. For intervention to be a
signal, some economists would require
that its linkage to policy be clear, that
past interventions have had a consistent
relationship with subsequent monetary
policy so that the implied policy is cred-
ible, and that information about the
intervention is communicated accu-
rately to market participants.
• How Intervention Works
Intervention operations technically fall
under the purview of the Treasury De-
partment, although the Federal Reserve
System and the Treasury act in concert
and split the transactions for their sepa-
rate accounts. U.S. intervention opera-
tions conducted at the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York entail the purchase or
sale of foreign currencies against U.S.
dollars. By purchasing a foreign currency
with dollars, authorities are attempting to
depreciate the dollar relative to that for-
eign currency. Generally, the Fed either
places the order to buy or sell foreign
exchange with commercial banks or util-
izes brokers.
Economists usually analyze sterilized
intervention. Sterilization refers to the
offsetting transaction undertaken to pre-
vent the purchase or sale of dollars from
influencing the domestic money supply.
Thus, to sterilize a $1 billion purchase of
German marks, which injects $1 billion
Foreign exchange intervention by
central banks purportedly influences
exchange rates by signaling changes
in future monetary policy. However,
for this signaling mechanism to
make sense, the linkage between
intervention and monetary policy
should be clear, the implied policy
should be credible, and information
about intervention should be com-
municated accurately to market
participants. The author discusses
why all three requirements are
highly questionable and why the sig-
naling mechanism should therefore
be viewed with skepticism.into the banking system, the Fed sells $1
billion of U.S. government securities,
which withdraws the dollars. The net
result is that investors own $1 billion
more of U.S. government securities, but
the money supply has not changed.
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The United States is said to sterilize its
intervention operations routinely and
automatically. However, Lewis (1993)
argues that, at times, individual financial
institutions involved in the operation
may allow their reserve levels to be tem-
porarily influenced by the debiting of
their reserve account (in the case of pur-
chasers of foreign exchange).
4 This
could explain a relationship between
intervention and the monetary aggregates
over two-week intervals.
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The fact that the intervention operations
of other countries may not be routinely
sterilized is another complication. This is
relevant to determining the impact of
intervention, since exchange rates should
be influenced by the growth rates of the
monetary aggregates of both countries
whose currencies are involved in the
single exchange rate.
• The Signaling Mechanism
Economists view exchange rates as
reflecting market participants' expecta-
tions about "fundamentals," defined as
all factors that can influence the future
supply and demand for currencies. Since
the intervening authorities may know
something about future policies that the
public does not, the market may view a
purchase of German marks as a signal
that the authorities have information
implying that the price is going to rise.
In particular, if the intervening authori-
ties have some control over monetary
policy, their action may imply something
about future interest rates or the mone-
tary aggregates. If the public is confident
that the authorities are going to back up
their intervention operations with consis-
tent policy, then a relatively small inter-
vention, by sending a signal about future
policy, can have a relatively large effect
on exchange rates.
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• Doubts about the
Signaling Mechanism
At least three conditions may be required
for the signaling mechanism to make
sense. First, assuming that intervention
implies something about monetary pol-
icy, the implied policy should be credi-
ble. In other words, for a sale of dollars
to lower the price of dollars, it must be
the case that in the past and under similar
circumstances, sales of dollars have been
followed by monetary policies that in-
deed lowered the price of dollars.
Second, intervention's implication for
monetary policy should be clear. For
example, purchases of dollars may imply
that monetary policy will increase U.S.
interest rates. However, at times, mone-
tary policy decisions themselves involve
consideration of exchange-rate effects,
so that the distinction between interven-
tion and policy can become blurred. At
other times, monetary policy and inter-
vention can conflict.
Third, information about the interven-
tion operations themselves must be per-
ceived accurately by the market. I deal
with these concerns in turn below.
• Credibility and the
Historical Record
The financial markets may come to dis-
regard intervention that they do not per-
ceive as credible; thus, larger sales or
purchases of foreign currency may be
required to impact exchange rates. The
credibility of intervention could be
undermined if authorities attempt to
mislead the markets, taking advantage
of the fact that intervention does not
entail a commitment to any subsequent
policy action.
Thus, exploiting intervention's flexibil-
ity creates problems. Choosing to mis-
lead the market would require subse-
quent efforts to reestablish the credibility
of intervention as a signal. The higher
the cost of not backing up the interven-
tion, the more likely it is that it will be
backed up and will be perceived as cred-
ible. An obvious potential cost of not
backing up an intervention is that the
value of the currency being purchased
may decline. However, perhaps a more
important cost is the potential loss of
reputation, which could even extend into
the monetary policy arena.
The credibility of intervention as a signal
depends largely on the historical record.
Past interventions should have been re-
lated to monetary policy in a predictable
manner. However, this relationship is not
always clear and varies over time.
At certain times, intervention may have
been linked to money surprises — that
is, to the difference between the actual
money supply announced by the Fed and
the money supply anticipated and mea-
sured by surveys of market participants
before the actual data were released (see
Dominguez [1992]). Since the Fed may
know something about the actual money
supply numbers to be released, if the
number is going to be larger than the
market anticipates, the monetary author-
ities could signal this by intervening.
Selling dollars would signal a desire to
expand the money supply more, while
buying dollars would suggest that the
Fed believes the recent increase was too
large. This story implies that money sur-
prises should help us predict when inter-
vention will occur.
At other times, as noted by Lewis (1993),
intervention may be described as "lean-
ing against the wind" — a different type
of linkage with monetary policy. Sup-
pose that U.S. monetary policy is con-
tractionary, with the side effect of higher
U.S. interest rates strengthening the dol-
lar. If the increase in the dollar's value is
inconsistent with the overall policy
objective, the authorities might sell dol-
lars in an attempt to counter the effect of
policy, or to lean against the wind. This
implies that monetary policy should help
predict intervention. Tight money could
lead to selling dollars, while in the
Dominguez scenario, a relatively small
increase in the money supply could lead
to buying dollars.
There is evidence that both stories have
been true at some times but not at others.
The implication of Dominguez's story
—that money surprises help us predict
when intervention will occur—was true
after the shift in monetary policy in
October 1979, but not at other times.
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However, evidence in favor of Lewis's
leaning against the wind story is mixedTABLE 1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR ACTUAL,
REPORTED, AND RUMORED INTERVENTION:
JANUARY 2,1985-OCTOBER 11,1991



























































































U.S. vs. $U.S.: U.S. intervention vis-a-vis unspecified currencies, carried out in terms of U.S. dollars.
U.S. vs. Mark: U.S. purchases or sales of German marks in terms of U.S. dollars.
U.S. vs. Yen: U.S. purchases or sales of yen in terms of U.S. dollars.
NOTE: "Buying" and "selling" columns refer to purchases and sales of millions of U.S. dollars.
SOURCE: Osterberg and Wetmore Humes (1993).
as well — whether or not monetary pol-
icy helps to predict intervention depends
on whether policy is measured by inter-
est rates or by the monetary aggregates.
Still other research questions particular
aspects of the signaling story. For exam-
ple, Klein and Rosengren (1991) study
the timing relationship between inter-
vention and subsequent monetary policy
around two important episodes of inter-
vention. Their results show that although
intervention initially acts as a signal, the
effect dissipates. Overall, they find no
consistent relationship between interven-
tion and monetary policy.
Lewis questions another linchpin in the
signaling mechanism — the assumption
that monetary policy influences ex-
change rates. In other words, even if in-
tervention signals a change in policy, we
need to know if the signal is reflected in
exchange rates over short intervals.
Lewis concludes that, in fact, monetary
policy may not influence exchange rates
in the near term.
In a related paper, Kaminsky and Lewis
(1993) find that intervention signals
changes in monetary policy, but some-
times in the direction opposite to that
expected. Overall, it appears that while
intervention sometimes influences
exchange rates or is related to monetary
policy as suggested by the signaling
hypothesis, no consistent relationship has
yet been isolated.
• Institutional Considerations
Institutional factors may disguise what
intervention is implying about monetary
policy at any given time. On some occa-
sions, monetary policy has been almost
explicitly committed to maintaining
exchange-rate goals in case intervention
fails. The Plaza Accord of September
1985, which reduced the international
value of the dollar, and the Louvre Ac-
cord of February 1987, aimed at stabiliz-
ing the dollar, are two examples of agree-
ments that may have implied near com-
mitments of monetary policy to back up
or even supplant periods of intervention
immediately following these agreements.
On the other hand, it may not always be
clear to the market whether an interven-
tion is being directed by the Fed or the
Treasury. For example, there might have
been no linkage between monetary pol-
icy and Fed foreign exchange operations
that critics claim were undertaken to
finance Treasury operations that could
otherwise have required congressional
approval (in the case of actions under-
taken to defend the gold stock in 1961
and 1962).
8 Any ambiguity in the mar-
ket concerning the relationship between
the Treasury and the Fed would be
expected to weaken the signal given by
intervention.
• The Accuracy of
Market Information
Recent research has called into question
the accuracy of the market's information
about intervention operations, and the
impact that such inaccuracy may have on
exchange rates. The Fed does not rou-
tinely announce its interventions. The
possibility that some segments of the
market do not know about intervention
arises from the way in which the opera-
tions are conducted. If the Fed uses a
commercial bank as a counterparty, the
bank will notify the market that an order
has been placed; a broker, however, is
under no such obligation. The news from
the commercial bank appears on the wire
services and may subsequently circulate
by less formal means. It is possible that
the efficacy of intervention is related
either to the method of intervention or to
such asymmetry of information.
Several researchers have compared offi-
cial U.S. intervention data with inter-
vention as reported by the newspapers.
The presumption seems to be that infor-
mation which reaches the newspapers
corresponds to that held by the market
as a whole. Klein (1993) collected data
from The New York Times and The Wall
Street Journal and found that the proba-
bility of actual intervention being re-
ported was 0.72, while the chance that
reported intervention had occurred was
0.88. Dominguez and Frankel (1993)
looked at the same two newspapers plus
the Financial Times and found that 73
percent of intervention operations were
reported.
9It is unclear whether the unreported
interventions correspond to those under-
taken with brokers. In addition, the
information about intervention opera-
tions that appears in the newspapers is
inconsistent, often excluding the exact
identity of the intervening countries or
the amount of the intervention. In an ear-
lier paper (Osterberg and Wetmore
Humes [1993]), I calculated the average
reported amounts of U.S. intervention,
which are presented in table 1. Klein
showed that larger interventions are
more likely to be reported.
Some research has shown that the dis-
tinction between actual intervention
and intervention reported by the news-
papers may matter to the exchange
market. Dominguez (1993) finds that
the impact of unreported intervention
is smaller than that of actual interven-
tion that was reported. In a current
study, I show not only that the impact
of intervention depends on whether it
was reported, but also that the sign of
the impact varies (Osterberg and Wet-
more Humes [1995]). In addition, I
find some evidence that for one sample
period, false reports of intervention
may have affected the yen/dollar
exchange rate.
• Conclusion
Although intervention may at times sig-
nal monetary policy intentions, analysts
should be wary about reading too much
into any particular episode. The mone-
tary policy implied by any one interven-
tion may depend on market conditions
and available policy options. At times,
policy could be expected to support
intervention, while at other times it may
be motivated by efforts to lean against
the wind.
Institutional factors also imply that
intervention may sometimes be indistin-
guishable from monetary policy or that
the signal given by intervention for
monetary policy may be weakened by
ambiguity about the relationship
between the Treasury and the Federal
Reserve. Recent studies showing that
the impact of intervention depends on
whether the news reached the news-
papers seem consistent with the view
that the signaling effect could be under-
mined by the way in which information
is communicated to the market.
• Footnotes
1. Of course, the intervening authorities
might claim either that the impact of inter-
vention depends on subtleties which are not
adequately modeled by researchers, or that
intervention is sometimes undertaken to sur-
prise the market and "keep participants hon-
est," without the expectation that exchange
rates will move in any particular direction.
2. In fact, The Wall Street Journal (March 3,
1995) reported one analyst's contention that
the market would not be convinced by the
intervention unless central banks moved
interest rates in a manner that would support
the dollar.
3. The portfolio balance channel for the
influence of intervention operates only if
investors care about the currency denomina-
tion of their portfolio. In terms of the exam-
ple given in the text, investors may require a
higher rate of return on U.S. government se-
curities in order to be willing to purchase $ 1
billion more of them. One way in which the
rate of return could be sufficient for inves-
tors to hold more U.S.-dollar-denominated
securities is if the exchange rate were to
change.
4. As discussed below, several commercial
banks are typically chosen to be the counter-
parties through which the Federal Reserve
conducts its intervention operations.
5. The two-week intervals are associated
with reserve accounting requirements.
6. This signaling mechanism can be con-
trasted with the belief that, since a typical
daily intervention of $1 billion is a drop in
the bucket compared to the over $1 trillion
circulated daily in the world's currency mar-
kets, a shift in the demand for foreign cur-
rency (or in the supply of dollars) may sim-
ply not be great enough to have a significant
impact.
7. The Federal Reserve System switched to
targeting the monetary aggregates in October
1979. Dominguez found that over an interval
following this shift, monetary policy was
perceived as highly credible, and money sur-
prises in fact helped to predict subsequent
intervention.
8. See Humpage (1994) for further examples
and a more detailed discussion.
9. See Dominguez and Frankel (1993), table
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The Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
and the Journal of Money, Credit and
Banking are jointly sponsoring a confer-
ence on Derivatives and Intermediation:
Theory and Evidence.
The growing derivatives market poses
several challenges for policymakers. The
first is to understand the sources of
financial innovation resulting in the pro-
liferation of these products. What eco-
nomic forces make derivatives viable
instruments? What gains do rational
participants obtain from these contracts,
and why do they dominate transactions
in the cash securities markets? To what
extent does regulatory policy—bank-
ruptcy rules, capital requirements, ac-
counting rules, and deposit insurance—
affect the market? In other words, does
derivative-related financial innovation
stem from changes in the marketplace
or from changes in the regulatory envi-
ronment? The answer is crucial to
understanding both derivatives and
intermediation. The second challenge
for policymakers is to understand how
derivatives impact regulatory concerns
in the areas of bank risk, payments sys-
tem reform, and intermediary powers.
Call for Papers
The conference proceedings will be
published in the Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking, and authors will
receive an honorarium. Prospective con-
tributors are invited to send a completed
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